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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this study is examining how firm-specific factors and entry mode choice (including 
the non-conventional forms) of Japanese multinational enterprises determine the financial performance of 
their Australian subsidiaries. We expect that the firm will make choices regarding the FDI strategy in such 
a way as to make the best possible use of its resources in achieving its FDI goals. Firms must decide what 
entry mode best utilizes their resources and is most likely to lead to successful financial performance.  
The financial performance of Japanese subsidiaries located in Australia is compared on the basis of the 
ownership-based entry mode of 209 subsidiaries between 1992 and 2002. 
Performance data at the subsidiary level provide strong evidence that the non-conventional ownership 
structures differed in their incidence and performance. 
Our results show that the Trinational IJV and Traditional JV modes were the least successful choices, while 
Intrafirm JV entries were the most likely to show a financial gain followed by Cross-national DJV and 
Wholly own entry mode.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Entry mode, Subsidiary’s performance, Japanese FDI in Australia.
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INTRODUCTION 
Japanese management practices have received considerable attention over the past fifteen years as 
Westerners have searched for the key to Japan’s economic success. This attention has shifted in the 
last few years from what the Japanese are doing at home to what they are doing overseas. This 
attention is due, in part, to the increased level of overseas investment by Japanese firms especially 
after the Plaza Accord of 1985, which caused a steep drop in the value of the dollar against the yen. 
(Bird and Beechler, 1995) 
With the preponderance of foreign investment projects, Australia provides a fruitful ground 
for an empirical test of the theoretical framework. Further, by focusing on one host country, Australia, 
we eliminate the between country variation that clouds the relationships to be examined. (Chen and Hu, 
2002). Japanese investment in Australia was $US32 billion, as at June 2003, making Japan the third 
largest investor in Australia. Japanese investments in Australia are concentrated in real estate, mining, 
commerce and the services sector. (Australia-Japan Trade and Economic Framework, 2005) 
This paper examines the links between firm-specific factors, entry mode and performance1 
of Japanese direct investment in Australia, adding to the body of international business research in two 
areas. The first of these is Japanese-Australian foreign direct investment which had received little 
attention in the literature. The United States, China and Europe have been a frequent subject of 
research. In recent years, Japan has attracted considerable scholarly attention as an outward investing 
country. In contrast, Australia has not been as frequent a subject of research.  
                                                  
1 Financial performance. 
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The second area investigated is the effect of firm specific factors and entry mode choice on 
subsidiary performance, using non-conventional forms of entry mode. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Several factors that determine the performance of foreign subsidiaries have been identified in 
the previous literature. These factors can be classified into three categories: ownership advantages of a 
firm, location advantages of a market, and entry mode strategies (Mansour and Hoshino, 2001). 
Japanese investment in Australia grew significantly in the late 1980s, but was heavily 
concentrate in a few industries. (Australia-Japan Trade and Economic Framework, 2005). Entry mode 
preferences have also shifted, away from wholly owned investments to a stronger use of joint ventures.  
Hypothesis 1: The industry of the Japanese foreign subsidiary affects its performance. 
When the parent company is diversifying through a FDI, uncertainty and information costs 
may be higher. Foreign investors are also more likely to face more risks if they are diversifying into a 
different industry, as they need tacit industry-specific knowledge, which is subject to relevant 
transaction costs and is also costly to acquire on the market (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Hypothesis 2: Financial performance will be higher when the Japanese shareholder is in the 
same industry as the planned subsidiary. 
Dimensional aspects are the key resources, which have been accumulated inside the firm over 
the time it has been in operating, and which are necessary to compete efficiently in certain business 
transactions or certain industries. A firm will enjoy competitive advantages over its rival if it owns 
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some of those vital assets. Firms with large sizes usually possess vital assets and oligopolistic 
advantages. (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 1999) 
Hypothesis 3: The large size of the parent company is associated with better performance by 
the subsidiary. 
The higher level of capital intensity of a foreign expansion demands greater resource 
commitment. Such a commitment not only strains a company’s capital and human resources, but also 
increases business and political risks (Hennart, 1988). The lower costs suggest that as the investment 
size decreases, subsidiaries are more likely to perform2. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the size of the subsidiary relative to that of the Japanese mother 
company, the greater the probability of a loss. 
As a firm expands its operation overseas, it has learned more about how to cope with 
different environments in terms of economic, political and legal systems, as well as the cultural 
distances. These learning skills can be applied to new foreign investment opportunities. When firms 
make international investments, specific knowledge of the host country is gained as is more general 
knowledge of conducting international operations (Barkema et al., 1998). As argued by the 
internationalization theorists, firms with more experience in a host country have developed 
organizational capabilities suited to that country, and are able to make greater commitments to foreign 
investments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  
                                                  
2 The size of the subsidiary may change in the future. In this research we were interested in the size of the 
subsidiary at the time of the operation (time of the entry). 
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Hypothesis 5: The Japanese firm’s experience in the host market will be associated with 
better performance by the FDI in that country. 
A problem comes when foreign employers’ expectations clash with local employees’ 
expectations. With the enormous increase in cross-border corporate integration over the recent years, 
this problem is looming increasingly large (Segalla, 2001). A parent’s human resources endowment 
may also affect its performance. When a foreign firm goes abroad, it has to deal with a staff of 
employees, with their own routines and culture. Integrating such employees is difficult, particularly so 
if there are cultural differences between the two countries (Hennart and Reddy, 1997). The 
management of the subsidiary’s labor force can therefore be left to the local manager (Hennart and 
Reddy, 1997). Hence performance will be greater when the subsidiary’s manager is non Japanese.  
Hypothesis 6: Subsidiaries with non Japanese managers will exhibit better performance. 
 
Costs and benefits initialized, when the entry mode decisions are made, will be reflected in 
the subsequent performance of the venture. Thus, a correct decision on entry mode should improve a 
company’s long-term performance (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Similarly, a mode inappropriately 
chosen will lead to high transaction costs and low transaction benefits, conditions under which a 
venture’s performance will suffer (Chen and Hu, 2002). In the hierarchical model of market entry 
modes, the wholly owned entry can be categorized into the equity based entry modes, because it 
requires a major recourse commitment in the overseas location (Pan and Tse, 2000). One advantage of 
a wholly owned investment is the transferring of firm-specific advantages to a foreign market, without 
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the risk of losing control over that competence. This is especially the case when a firm’s competitive 
advantage is based on technological know-how which is one of the core competencies of a firm. 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). Another advantage of wholly owned investments is that they give a firm 
tight control over operations in different countries, which is necessary in a global strategy.  
Hypothesis 7-a: Wholly owned investments achieve higher financial performance than other 
entry mode types. 
 
Establishing a wholly owned subsidiary is a very costly way of entering a foreign country. 
Companies must bear the full costs of setting up a new plant, finding suitable employees, costs of 
learning different government restriction and different law systems. Overall wholly owned investment 
can be a very risky market entry mode, as the investors may have to carry the risk of sunk cost alone in 
a new and uncertain marketplace. In the other hand, Equity International Joint Ventures (JV’s) are a 
very popular entry mode, especially in the Asia/Pacific area. Despite this popularity, they seem to have 
poor performance records and high failure rates. Scholars found a less then 50% survival rate (Zeira 
and Newburry, 1999). The main idea behind an IJV is that the transaction costs of entering a foreign 
market are much lower then those faced when establishing a wholly owned subsidiary. The entering 
firm is able to benefit from the local partners knowledge of the host country’s competitive conditions, 
culture, language, political and business systems. Joint venture ownership structure has traditionally 
been defined by the percentage of equity held by the foreign parent. Where the foreign parent has a 
greater than 50 percent equity stake, the JV is called a majority-owned JV. If ownership is equal to 
50%, the JV is considered co-owned, and if the equity holding is less than 50%, the JV is identified as 
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a minority-owned (Makino and Delios, 1996). Some rare studies explicitly identified and considered 
JVs that were formed by multiple partners, or JVs that were formed between a foreign firm and a 
partner not based in the host country (Hennart, 1988). However, the international joint venture 
literature has focused on two parent JVs formed between one foreign and one local firm. But other 
types of JVs exist. Makino and Beamish (1998) introduced new forms of JVs that are frequently 
occurring. They introduced a new typology which looks at JVs formed by multiple (three or more) 
firms; with non-local firms (home- and third country based firms); and by affiliated firms (JVs formed 
between the parent firm and its domestic or foreign subsidiaries). See Figure 1 
However, subsidiary performance is also threatened by cultural differences. That’s why it is 
important to take into account the moderating effects of cultural distance and to improve our 
understanding of how culture impacts performance. Previous researches (Birkinshaw and Hood’s, 
1998) came to the conclusion that the foreign subsidiary development and performance depend on 
parent company, subsidiary, and host country factors. Yet, cultural differences moderate these 
relationships and may even eliminate the ability of MNEs to create or make use of valuable resources 
(Uhlenbruck, 2004).  
Hypothesis 7-b: Intrafirm JVs achieve high financial performance compared to other entry 
mode types. 
Hypothesis 7-c: Trinational IJVs and Traditional JVs achieve lower financial performance 
than other entry mode types. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Scope of the study 
The main objective of this study examines how firm-specific factors and entry mode choice 
of Japanese multinational enterprises determine the performance of their Australian subsidiaries.  
This paper suggests that different entry modes have different performance outcomes based upon their 
resource and organizational control demands. Likewise, we assume that firm-specific factors are able 
to exert influence over the performance of the Japanese subsidiaries in Australia. 
 
Sample 
The data used for this study was obtained from Toyo Keizai Inc., Japanese overseas 
investment, listed by country, (Toyo Keizai Inc., 1992-2001). The data for the independent variables 
are derived from Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan, Toyo Keizai Inc., Japanese overseas investment, listed by 
firms and the Japan Company Handbook, when unavailable from the former source. In this study, only 
operations in the Australian market were examined. The basic selection criteria were that a subsidiary 
had to be established between 1992 and 20023.  
Because the tendency for new subsidiaries to take some time before their performance 
stabilizes, this study follows Woodcock et al. (1994) in analyzing only those subsidiaries which were 
at least two years old at the time of the data collection. After adjusting for missing data, the final 
sample size was 209 subsidiaries.  
                                                  
3 The sample was selected from the period between 1992 and 2002 because of the high number of investments in this period 
comparing to other decades. 
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, subsidiary performance, is a three-point item assessing the 
subsidiary’s financial performance in 2001. The scale points were (1) Gain, (2) break-even, and (3) 
loss.  
Independent variables 
Following the recommendations of previous work, we took a step toward developing a more 
comprehensive theory by investigating the influence of firm-specific factors and entry mode on 
performance. 
We also made a distinction between the types of entry mode by using non-conventional entry 
mode types. Concerning the explanatory effects, we use the following set of independent variables. 
Entry mode variables 
 FDI entries with at least 95 percent Japanese ownership are categorized as wholly owned 
subsidiaries; and as international joint venture (IJV) if otherwise (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). In 
this paper, non conventional types of entry mode were also used. Makino and Beamish (1998) 
introduced four distinct forms of JVs based on the JVs partners' nationality and equity affiliation. JVs 
that are formed between affiliated home-country based firms (Intrafirm JV); JVs that are formed 
between unaffiliated home-country based firms (Cross-national DJV); JVs that are formed between 
home-country based and local firms (Traditional JV); and JVs that are formed between home-country 
and third-country based firms (Trinational IJV). (Makino and Beamish, 1998)[See Figure 1] 
A variable, TRAENTRY, to check whether the type of entry mode also affects the 
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performance, was added to the multinomial logistic regression. This dummy variable is equal to one if 
the entry mode type is a Traditional JV or a Trinational IJV, and zero otherwise. 
Firm-specific variables 
 The product differentiation variable is a dummy variable equal to one, if one of the products 
manufactured by the subsidiary was also produced by the parent, and zero otherwise (COMMON). 
Natural logarithm of the parent’s Capital is used to provide more comparable scale units as other 
variables used in the model (SIZEMOTH). This variable captures the parent size at entry. The data 
was obtained from the issue of Toyo Keizai Inc., a complete listing by firms; and the Nikkei Kaisha 
Nenkan database published in the year before the corresponding Japanese entry. This variable is a 
proxy of the parent company’s size. Capital intensity in a foreign invested enterprise is reflected in the 
total investment committed to a project (RELATIVE). It is the relative ratio of the size (investment) of 
the subsidiary to the size (Capital) of the parent company. RELATIVE is used to provide more 
comparable scale units as other variables used in the model. A dummy variable, equal to one if the 
subsidiary is in a resource-based industry and zero otherwise (INDUSTRY) is also used. The 
international experience variable is a dummy variable, equal to one if the parent company had an 
experience in the same country (EXPERIEN). 
Control variable 
A socio-cultural distance variable is also used. It is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
subsidiary’s manager is Japanese or not (MANAGER). Because nationality and cultural groups are 
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good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management, the 
variables MANAGER was added. 
 
RESULTS 
The analytical framework in this study is implemented in two stages. First, we attempt to 
establish the relationship between prescribed modes of entry and their impact on performance.  
In the second stage of the analysis, we verify the influence of the firm specific factors, the entry mode 
type variable and the control variable on the choice of entry mode. 
Because of the nature of the dependent variable, a three-point item, which violates a 
fundamental assumption of Ordinary Least Squares regression (that the dependent variable is normally 
distributed), we use a multinomial logistic regression, which is more appropriate in such cases 
(Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992 ). 
Table 1 gives statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in the study. The 
matrix of the independent variables suggests little collinearity. Almost all correlations are low, the two 
highest coefficients being the ones between EXPERIEN and SIZEMOTH (.417) and between 
MANAGER and INDUSTRY (.316). 
 
Analyzing the results of the cross-tabulation analysis 
Table 2 illustrates the results of the classification. In our sample, 131 (62.7%) were wholly 
owned, 33 (15.8%) were Traditional JVs, 20 (9.6%) were Intrafirm JVs, 22 (10.5%) were Cross-
national DJVs, and 3 (1.4%) were Trinational IJVs. The first column from the left lists the number of 
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partners. In this sample, the number of two-partner venture represented less than 28% of the total cases 
and 71% of the total JVs. Almost 30% of the JVs had three or more partners.  
Table 3 provides the results of the cross-tabulation analysis which examined the relationship 
between financial performance and ownership structure. Marginal frequencies show that 64.1% of the 
subsidiaries were profitable, while 22.5% had a loss in 2001. Intrafirm JVs had the best performance, 
85% of Intrafirm JVs were classified as profitable, or “gain.” Among the other four entry types, Cross-
national DJVs had the second best performance (63.6%), followed by Wholly Own (63.4%) and 
Traditional JVs (57.6%). Trinational IJVs were the worst performers with 66.7% of unprofitable cases. 
The goodness-of-fit of the independence model was significant, with a chi-Square significance=0.030. 
This result suggests that there was a significant difference in performance among the five ownership 
structures.  
Analyzing the results of the multinomial logistic regression 
The results of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in Tables 4. Overall, the data 
supported the model, although some specific hypotheses were not supported. The table shows the 
values of the coefficients and the level of significance of each independent variable for predicting a 
subsidiary’s performance as Gain or Break-even. Loss is not reported because only two equations are 
determined for a three-level dependent variable in multinomial logistic regression. However, the loss 
coefficients would be the same magnitude as the Gain coefficients but in the opposite direction 
(Konopaske et al., 2002). In addition, the number of cases correctly predicted by the model, the chi-
square of the model, the value of the likelihood function and the expected signs of the variables are 
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reported as well. The table reports the results for the full sample. The model has a high overall 
explanatory power, a chi-square of 34.735 (0.002) 
COMMON, SIZEMOTH, TRAENTRY and MANAGER were all found to be significant 
predictors of subsidiary’s profitable performance (Gain). The variable EXPERIEN is, however, 
significantly negatively related to break-even. With the exception of MANAGER and EXPERIEN, 
significant variables have the predicted signs. The coefficient of COMMON is positive and 
significant; this means that when the parent also produced one of the products manufactured by the 
subsidiary, the international venture will perform better. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, SIZEMOTH is 
positively related to profitable performance. The coefficient of MANAGER, our measure of 
endowment in human resources is significant, but entering with a negative sign, suggesting that with a 
Japanese manager the subsidiary will perform better. This contradicts hypothesis 6 which conjectured 
that subsidiaries with non Japanese managers will exhibit better performance. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 7-c, the coefficient of TRAENTRY is significant but entering with a negative sign, 
suggesting that the traditional and trinational entry types tend to achieve lower financial performance 
than other entry mode types. 
In contradiction to what was hypothesized, EXPERIEN is negatively related to profitable 
performance, but not at a statistically significant level. The variable is, however, significantly 
negatively related to break-even. 
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The coefficient of INDUSTRY and RELATIVE are insignificant, suggesting that the type of 
industry and the size of the investment do not increase the probability that the Japanese subsidiary will 
exhibit better performance, as we suggested in hypothesis 1, and 4. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Using a sample of 209 Japanese firms entering Australia over the period 1992–2002, our 
results show the model correctly predicts over 66% of the mode choices. Thus, we provide strong 
initial evidence to support using firm specific factors and ownership structures to predict subsidiaries 
performance. Our analysis showed that Intrafirm JVs provided the greatest opportunity to achieve 
superior performance, and Trinational IJVs had the greatest likelihood of Loss; Cross-national DJVs 
and Wholly own provided the second highest opportunity for attaining superior performance, and 
compared to Traditional IJVs, they attain a superior performance. These results suggest that 
management complexity from inter-partner cultural distance may have a significant impact on the 
performance of the subsidiary. 
Our result suggests that sharing the costs of the FDI with partners from the same culture, or 
even better, from the same group, was the critical factor that improved performance. Cultural distance 
at both country and corporate levels was strongly related to the performance of the FDI. Thus we 
provide an empirical support for previous studies (Makino and Beamish, 1998) that Intrafirm JVs and 
Cross-national DJVs with a small cultural distance between the partners perform better then other 
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types of entry modes. Previous studies have found that an Intrafirm JV and a Cross-national DJV 
represent longer-term solutions for attaining JV success. A Trinational IJV is usually the least 
desirable of the ownership-structure types, as it incurs the highest termination rate and achieves the 
lowest performance (Makino and Beamish, 1998). 
The variable related to the endowment in human resources shows that a manager’s nationality 
influences the profitability of an international investment. The coefficient of MANAGER is positive, 
contrary to what was expected. When nationality and cultural group assume a crucial role, when they 
are good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management 
and when the competitive success of the firm depends on the capability of the company to manage 
them, a Japanese manager represents the best solution. 
Conversely, very large firms’ subsidiaries show a propensity towards high profits. Although 
previous empirical results have been conflicting, there is some support for the position that 
organizations that are large, face less turbulent environments, and have a higher mass output 
orientation. (Mutelli and Piscitello, 1998). Likewise, the fact that the affiliate produces a product also 
manufactured by the parent seems to affect positively the performance. When the parent company is 
diversifying trough a FDI, uncertainty and information costs may be higher, so that less gain will be 
generated. That is shown by the positive sign of the variable COMMON. As conjectured in hypothesis 
2, financial performance will be higher when the Japanese shareholder is in the same industry as the 
planned subsidiary. Results show also that the proxies of the different aspects of the firm’s experience 
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in managing foreign operations due to previous FDI undertaken in the same country (EXPERIEN) 
negatively influence the propensity to get a high profit (although this variable is significant only in the 
case of Break-even).  
The type of industry INDUSTRY and the relative size RELATIVE have no impact on the 
subsidiary’s performance. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study examined the influence of firm specific advantages and entry mode choice on 
performance. This paper examines these issues by answering the following questions. First, when 
investing in Australia, how do Japanese’s firm specific factors affect the performance? Second, what is 
the impact of entry modes on performance of these investment projects?  
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: When the parent company has 
the same product as the established subsidiary, its subsidiary will exhibit a high profit. Likewise, very 
large firms’ subsidiaries show a propensity toward high profits. We also found that the probability of 
subsidiary’s loss increases when the parent company has experience in the Australian market and 
when the subsidiary’s manager in Australia is non Japanese. 
This research examines also the performance of entry modes that have been rarely considered 
in previous studies. The Trinational IJV mode was the least successful choice, while Intrafirm JV 
entries were the most likely to show a financial gain followed by Cross-national DJV and Wholly own 
entry mode.  
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Nevertheless, this study also has limitations. The empirical study was conducted using the 
samples of Japanese subsidiaries in Australia only. This restricted the study to the behavior of one-
nationality parents in one host market. Future studies may be able to conduct more extensive tests with 
the samples including multiple-nationality parents in one host country or one-nationality parents in 
several host countries. Also other studies could use a firms’ direct response rather than secondary data 
as input in conducting a relatively large-scale empirical investigation of this topic. Finally, Joint 
effects of firm-specific advantages and entry mode on performance rest to be undertaken. The findings 
of this study provide the implication of firm specific factors and of the importance of entry mode 
decision on performance. Although each entry mode has different performance profile, performance of 
subsidiaries is also affected by the fit between the parent firm's-specific advantages and entry mode 
choice. 
Although this study has its limitations, it has clearly provided a theoretical and practical 
insight into the factors affecting the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Other studies could use our 
research as a basis to extend work in this area toward a better understanding of the link between 
foreign entry mode, firm specific-advantages and subsidiary performance. 
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Figure 1: Joint Venture Ownership Options from the Home-county Based Firm Perspective 
 
 Partner Partner JV Ownership 
 Affiliation Nationality Structures 
 
 Affiliated   Home Intrafirm JVs 
 
 
 
 Home Cross-national DJVs 
 
 Unaffiliated Host Traditional IJVs 
 
 Third Trinational IJVs 
Source: Makino and Beamish (1998) 
 
 
Table 1: Pearson correlation (coefficient/(case)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY: Entry into manufacturing industry (manufacturing 
industry = 1; otherwise = 0). 
COMMON: Sameness of products between parent and subsidiary. 
SIZEMOTH: capital of the parent company 
RELATIVE: Relative size: subsidiary/parent. 
EXPERIEN: Experience in the host country. 
MANAGER: Nationality of the subsidiary’s’ manager 
(Japanese= 1; not Japanese= 0). 
TRAENTRY: Entry mode type (Taditional JV& 
Tinational IJV=1, otherwise=0)
 Industry Common Sizemoth Relative Experience manager Traentry 
Industry 1 
(209) 
      
Common 0.095 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
     
sizemoth 0.017 
(209) 
-0.229 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
    
Relative 0.156 
(209) 
0.075 
(209) 
-0.128 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
   
Experien 0.108 
(209) 
-0.194 
(209) 
0.417 
(209) 
-0.139 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
  
Manager -0.316 
(209) 
0.003 
(209) 
-0.011 
(209) 
-0.192 
(209) 
-0.023 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
 
Traentry 0.162 
(209) 
0.165 
(209) 
-0.162 
(209) 
0.238 
(209) 
-0.107 
(209) 
-0.259 
(209) 
1 
(209) 
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Table 2: Comparison of the Entry mode Formation by the Ownership Structure. 
 Type of Entry 
No of Partners Wholly own Traditional 
JVs 
Intrafirm JVs Cross-
national DJV 
TrinationalIJV 
1 (n=129) 
100% 
 
 
 
 
  
2 (n=2)* 
3.5% 
(n=26) 
45.6% 
(n=17) 
29.8% 
(n=10) 
17.5% 
(n=2) 
3.5% 
3  (n=6) 
40.0% 
(n=2) 
13.3% 
(n=6) 
40.0% 
(n=1) 
6.7% 
4  (n=1) 
16.7% 
(n=1) 
16.7% 
(n=4) 
66.7% 
 
5    (n=2) 
100% 
 
Total (n=131) 
62.7% 
(n=33) 
15.8% 
(n=20) 
9.6% 
(n=22) 
10.5% 
(n=3) 
1.4% 
* in two cases, the percentage of the main Japanese investor was over the threshold of 95% (wholly 
own) but less than 100%, and the rest was brought from a partner. 
 
Table 3: Entry mode Structure and Performance: Result of the Cross-tabulation 
Analysis. 
Pearson chi-Squared    17.035 (0.030) 
Entry mode performance No. of  
Cases 
 1 2 3 
 Gain Breakeven Loss 
 
Wholly own (n=83) 
63.4% 
(n=16) 
12.3% 
(n=32) 
24.4% 
131 
 
Traditional JVs 
 
(n=19) 
57.6% 
(n=3) 
9.1% 
(n=11) 
33.3% 
33 
Trinational IJV (n=1) 
33.3% 
 
 
(n=2) 
66.7% 
3 
Intrafirm JVs (n=17) 
85.0% 
(n=3) 
15.0% 
 
 
20 
Cross-national 
DJV 
(n=14) 
63.6% 
(n=6) 
27.3% 
(n=2) 
9.1% 
22 
Total (n=134) 
64.1% 
(n=28) 
13.4% 
(n=47) 
22.5% 
209 
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Table 4:  The results of the multinomial logistic regression 
 
 
 Overall  
Model 
Profit Break-even 
Variables Hypothesized 
sign 
 
Chi-square 
Regression 
coefficient 
Regression 
coefficient 
INDUSTRY + 0.393 (0.821) -0.184 (0.688) -0.429 (0.542) 
COMMON + 13.020 (0.001) 1.401 (0.002)* 0.509 (0.399) 
SIZEMOTH + 7.736 (0.021) 0.564 (0.010)* 0.420 (0.154) 
RELATIVE - 3.454 (0.178) 0.02 (0.296) 0.001 (0.296) 
EXPERIEN + 3.696 (0.158) -0.538 (0.219) -1.090 (0.059)* 
MANAGER - 6.168 (0.046) 0.959 (0.025)* 1.304 (0.055)* 
TRAENTRY                    - 2.986 (0.225) -0.810 (0.086)* -0.765 (0.276) 
Intercept 6.450 (0.040) -3.699 (0.024)* -3.865 (0.080)* 
     
-2 Log likelihood  337.222 (0.002)   
Proportion of correct 
classifications 
 67.0%   
Model Chi-squared  34.735 (0.002)   
     
      
Note: Significance in parentheses. 
Number of cases: 209 
*Correlation is Significant 
INDUSTRY: Entry into manufacturing industry (manufacturing industry = 1; otherwise = 0). 
COMMON: Sameness of products between parent and subsidiary. 
SIZEMOTH: capital of the parent company 
RELATIVE: Relative size: subsidiary/parent. 
EXPERIEN: Experience in the host country. 
MANAGER: Nationality of the subsidiary’s’ manager (Japanese= 1; not Japanese= 0). 
TRAENTRY: Entry mode type (Traditional JV& Tinational IJV=1, otherwise=0) 
 
